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Abstract 	  
Changes in the capital structure before and after the global financial crisis for SMEs 
are studied, emphasizing their financing problems, distinguishing between internal 
financing and external financing determinants. The empirical research bears upon 158 
small and medium-sized firms listed on Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges in 
China over the period of 2004-2014.   A regression analysis, along the lines of the 
Trade-Off Theory, shows that the leverage decreases with profitability, non-debt tax 
shields and the liquidity, and increases with firm size and tangibility. A positive 
relationship is found between firm growth and debt ratio, though not highly 
significantly. It is shown that the SMEs with high growth rates are those which will 
more easily obtain external financing after a financial crisis.  It is recognized that the 
China government should reconsider SMEs taxation laws. 	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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The financing sources of small and medium size enterprises (SMEs) can be divided 
into internal financing and external financing (Ross et al., 2013). The internal 
financing is obtained from firm owners, retained earnings or depreciation  (Ross et al., 
2013).  
 
By itself, internal financing cannot satisfy an SME development.  Thus, SMEs are 
looking for other means of financing:  among these, bank loans are among the main 
sources. However, banks set several restrictions when lending to SMEs;  for example, 
banks increase the costs for loans as well as the collateral and shorten the repayment 
period. Often, SMEs cannot provide enough collateral assets or reliable financial 
statements to offset the information asymmetry and adverse selection risks for money 
lenders (Paulet et al., 2014). Understandably, banks prefer to deal with large, old, 
known companies with high information transparency (Nguyen et al., 2015). Thus, 
compared to internal financing, external financing is expensive and hard to obtain for 
small businesses (Jiang et al., 2014).  
 
One has already been much concerned about the impact of the financial crisis on 
SMEs, - mainly due to the consequently numerous bankruptcies. One can point to the 
overall financial environment of a country or to the whole world. A practical cause 
has been found in the increased cost of production together with a decreased demand 
of whatever product. It is easily pointed out that the decrease in profit implies that any 
internal financing possible options will decrease.  
 
Moreover, the global financial crisis which broke out in 2008 is considered by the 
IMF (http://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/apr/09/useconomy.subprimecrisis) 
to have been the most dangerous crisis since the Great Depression. During this 
recession period, the financing problems for SMEs became even worse than usual. 
For example, the banks especially large banks set several restrictions when lending to 
SMEs: banks increase the costs for loans as well as the collateral and shorten the 
repayment period in order to reduce risks during the financial crisis.  Consider the PR 
China case: according to the statistics of CBRC (China Banking Regulatory 
Commission), the total lending by state-controlled banks in 2008 are 2.2 trillion. 
However, the small business loans only account for 15 percent (i.e. 300 billion). More 
than 20 percent of the registered SMEs went bankrupt and another 20 percent are still 
facing severe shortages of capital, e.g. as noticed in the first quarter of 2009 
(Cunningham, 2011). Compared to the state-owned businesses, the SMEs received 
much less protection and support from the China government during the crisis 
 
Thus, it seems useful to pin point the determinants of SMEs capital structure changes, 
in particular ca. financial crisis time, in order to expect solutions or at least give some 
advice in order to reduce unfortunate issues. The present article is organized along 
such concerns about financing difficulties of SMEs, taking into account information 
asymmetry, relationships between banks and enterprises, and internal limitations 
within the SMEs’ financial system. Based on the pertinent literature, after identifying 
a few gaps in previous studies, 6 factors are chosen as being the determinants of the 
capital structure: beside the dependent variable, i.e. total debt to total asset ratio, one 
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has the (i) returns on assets,  - its “profitability”, (ii) its non-debt tax shields, (iii) its 
liquidity, measured by the quick ratio,  (iv) the size  (assets) of the firm, (v) its 
tangibility, and (vi) a firm growth characteristics, i.e. the operating profit margin. 
Noticing that profitability and liquidity of SMEs, two internal financing means, are 
considered to be more important for getting bank loans, - external financing nowadays 
than before the crisis, the analysis results indicate that the internal financing 
difficulties for SMEs should be more seriously tackled by political and economic 
authorities. This should be emphasized at once, because the	   capital	   structure	  decisions	  of	   SMEs	  differ	   according	   to	   the	   types	  of	   firms.	   	   Service	   SMEs’	   capital	  structure	  decisions	  are	  closer	   to	   the	  assumptions	  of	  Pecking	  Order	  Theory	  and	  rather	  removed	  from	  those	  of	  Trade-­‐Off	  Theory	  compared	  with	  the	  case	  of	  other	  types	  of	  	  manufacturing	  SMEs	  (Serrasqueiro	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Our	  analysis	  focuses	  on	  the	  latter	  type,	  suggesting	  to	  investigate	  a	  Trade-­‐Off	  Theory	  model. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In this section, we overview the pertinent literature regarding the objectives so 
outlined. More can be found in e.g. Abdulsaleh	  and	  Worthington	  (2013). 
 
Although this research is based on China data, the international facet should not be 
neglected. In brief, one may recall that the theories that explain the “to be perfect 
capital structure of a firm” reach no consistent conclusion (Seifert and Gonenc, 2010), 
even after Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem. The latter authors stated that in the 
absence of taxes, agency costs or other market imperfections, the market value of a 
firm is not affected by its leverage (Ross et al., 2013). This theory is based on strict 
conditions such as the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs and asymmetric 
information. Later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) added the corporate taxes into the 
theory and recognized the tax benefits (tax-shields) from interest payments. 
Thereafter, the trade-off theory (TOT), which includes a trade-off between the tax 
benefits from debt and financial distress costs, subsequently implies that there is an 
optimal debt to equity ratio for every firm which helps to balance the debt benefits 
and the increase in financial risks.  This debt to asset ratio naturally obviously 
becomes the dependent variable to study. 
 
In contrast, Myers (1984) introduced the Pecking Order  (POT) which implies that the 
financial managers prefer to finance new investments through internal financing 
(retained earnings).   Among others, Fama and French (2002) and Shyam-Sunder and 
Myers (1999) found that the POT can explain the financing choices made by firms.  
Fama and French (2005) also claimed that the SMEs exposed to the influence of the 
information asymmetry, are relying heavily on equity financing instead of debt 
financing. Indeed, small and medium enterprises do not obey the rules of the pecking 
order due to the information asymmetry (Frank and Goyal, 2003). Chen (2004), cited 
in Seifert and Gonenc (2010, p.4) reached the same conclusion for the Chinese 
market, proposing that Chinese firms obey a “new pecking order hypothesis": 
retained-earnings, equity and long-term debt (Seifert and Gonenc, 2010). 
 
More arguments on using Pecking Order Versus Trade-off theory framework can be 
found in  Sogorb-Mira  and López-Gracia (2003): “An Empirical Approach to the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Capital Structure”. 
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More generally speaking, one of the major reasons for SMEs’ financing difficulties is 
thought to be the information asymmetry. Indeed, the lack of equal information 
sharing leads to imbalances in the economy, thereby causing moral hazards and 
adverse selection problems. The imbalance lies both in the providers of funds and the 
receivers stands. Unlike large listed companies which can access funds from the 
capital markets, small and medium enterprises’ external financing sources are 
primarily found in banks. However, the weak information share between SMEs and 
banks limits the SMEs’ availability of banks  (Irwin and Scott, 2010). Consequently, 
SMEs are more vulnerable to capital flows than large firms, - especially during a 
financial crisis (Dong and Men, 2014). On the other hand, the limited financing 
channels put SMEs in a weak negotiating position with financial institutions. Not only 
SMEs do not get any preferential term, as compared with large firms, but also SMEs 
are constrained by several mandatory provisions, such as the offering of collateral and 
shortening the loan duration (Ang, 1991).  
 
The lack of face to face communication between SMEs and banks also leads to 
financing difficulties in another aspect. Banks prefer to choose large firms which have 
audited financial statements and “good governance” rather than small firms, - this in 
order to reduce expected credit risks. 
 
This leads us to outline the specific explanatory factors of the model, beside the 
dependent variable.  
 
2.1  Factors which can affect the internal financing of SMEs.  
  
(i) Profitability 
Researchers have different opinions on the relationship between the profitability and 
financial leverage. Titman and Wessels (1988) argued that the profitability is 
negatively related to leverage in the US market. More recent studies also support this 
negative relationship analysing various data (Booth et al.  (2001) for developing 
countries, and Wald (1999) for developed countries). It is argued that the large 
amount of free cash flow weakens the enterprises’ control of management 
(unnecessary spending). Thus, the shareholders would prefer to choose outside 
creditors to supervise the management when using external financing (Mallin, 2013). 
In this case, profitable firms tend to have higher leverage.  Yet, bank loans are 
relatively hard to obtain by SMEs, surely in China. Therefore, the enterprises would 
choose internal financing first. As the profitability increases, the reliance on external 
financing would decrease gradually. The assumption in this essay leans toward a 
negative relationship between debt ratio and profitability.  
 
(ii) Non-debt tax shields 
According to TOT, the financial leverage has a positive relationship with debt tax 
shields and a negative relationship with bankruptcy cost. DeAngelo and Masulis 
(1980, cited in Cheng and Green, 2008) found that not only the debt financing could 
provide tax shields, but also other expenses, e.g. depreciation and investment tax 
credits, have tax benefits as well. (These non-debt tax shields are substitutes for the 
accounting debt tax shield.)   However, both Titman and Wessels (1988) and Song 
(2005) argued that there is no statistically significant relationship between non-tax 
shields and debt. (There is also an opposite effect on short-term debt and long-term 
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debt.) Quite contrarily, Shahjahanpour et al. (2010) concluded that there is a negative 
relationship between the non-tax shields and leverage. The argument stems in the 
consideration that the depreciation level of the SMEs can affect their internal 
financing ability. A deduction of this depreciation should be an important source of 
internal funds. In other words, enterprises with higher non-debt tax shields usually 
prefer to have less debt, - and vice versa.  
 
Thus, considering the above, the assumption is this essay is that the non-tax shields 
variable is likely inversely associated with the SMEs’ debt ratio.  
 
(iii) Liquidity (Quick Ratio) 
The effect of the asset liquidity on capital structure has no consistent conclusion:  it 
has both positive and negative influence according to Mouamer (2011). On one hand, 
enterprises which have higher liquidity may have relatively greater debt ratio,-  in 
order to meet their short-term obligations. On the other hand, enterprises with high 
liquidity may use these assets to finance their future investment opportunities. Thus, 
the high liquidity enterprises could borrow less money from the financial institutions. 
Therefore, one can conclude that there is a negative influence on the enterprises’ debt 
ratio.  
 
In order to calculate the liquidity of the firms, we use the Quick Ratio to measure a 
company’s short-term liquidity. It measures the ability of a company to use its most 
liquid assets (i.e. current asset minus inventories) to extinguish its current liabilities. 
As firms’ quick ratio increases, the fund utilization rate might increase and the 
reliance on the debt financing would face a corresponding decrease (De Jong et al., 
2008). 
 
Thus, from the above discussion, we hypothesize that liquidity is negatively related to 
debt ratio. 
 
2.2  Factors which can affect the external financing of SMEs 
 
(iv) Firm Size 
Much of the current literature on the financing ability of a firm implies that it is 
affected by the firm size. It is found that large enterprises usually have relatively 
higher liabilities (Booth et al., 2001). Abor and Biekpe (2009) also provided evidence 
that in contrast to small firms, large firms prefer to use debt. The large firms with 
lower expected bankruptcy costs have relatively more easy access to loans and equity. 
However, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that there is a negative relationship 
between firm size and debt. The cause for this correlation sign resides in the large 
firms’ tendency to disclose “more information” than small firms. In so doing, the 
largest firms would be regulated more heavily than small firms, whence limiting the 
cost of information asymmetry for the former (Abor and Biekpe, 2009).  
 
Based on these assertions, for SMEs, we can assume that the firm size can increase 
the financing ability of the enterprises and should be positively related to the debt.  
 
 
(v) Tangibility 
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As argued by Chen et al. (2013), tangibility (a fixed assets over total assets ratio) is 
also an essential determinant of capital structure. Related research has shown that due 
to the information asymmetry, the firm managers can access more secured 
information on a company than other (external) creditors. Moreover, if the firms use 
debt financing, agency costs are required. However, the collateral assets would help 
reducing these costs, whence somewhat the information asymmetry problems. 
Moreover, the greater the collateral value, the lower the risk for the creditors (Amidu, 
2007). Thus, the collateral value can increase the external financing ability of a firm, 
to some extent.  
 
Thus, under high information asymmetry, financial institutions would fund those 
enterprises which have higher tangibility. It is therefore hypothesized that there is a 
positive relationship between tangibility and leverage. 
 
(vi) Firm Growth 
In the case of asymmetric information, high growth and competitive enterprises 
would tend to present a greater external financing ability than otherwise. The more so 
for SMEs. Nevertheless, under the current economic situation in China (i.e., within 
the information asymmetry frame), the actual management performance as well as 
actual economic conditions are hard to be measured by financial institutions. Thus, 
the firm growth should be considered as an important determinant to be studied.  
 
Heshmati (2001) already found that the fast-growing SMEs tend to have higher 
leverage, especially in concentrated ownership firms. However, Myers (1977) held 
the view that high growth firms might give up some investment opportunities, 
according to its presently positive net value, for various strategic manager 
incompetence. However, in so doing, this kind of firms’ capital structure would have 
a low proportion of debt, - not withstanding a possible conflict between bond holders 
and shareholders.  
 
Thus, the relationship between firm growth and debt ratio seems to be an interesting 
question (Abor and Biekpe, 2009), - a theoretical and empirical gap in the present 
framework. It is here presently hypothesized that Firm Growth is positively related to 
the debt ratio. 
 
 
 
III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
The essay is intended to analyze the small and medium listed enterprises’ (SME) 
financing issue before and after the financial crisis in China. At least 60 percent of 
China’s GDP is created by the SMEs. Meanwhile more than half of the SMEs are in 
the manufacturing industry sector (Tambunan, 2009).  The financing issue represents 
much of the main SMEs economics problems. One obviously needs some reliable and 
as much as possible “complete” data. Therefore, due to the difficulty of accessing 
China SMEs financial data, the data of listed companies is the only way to obtain 
some coherently meaningful and reliable data. 
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Thereafter, the data includes 158 manufacturing-listed SME’s quarterly reports over 
10 years (between January 2004 and December 2014) downloaded from the Guotai 
database. The subprime crisis period is considered to span from December 2007 to 
June 2009 as given by the NBER in http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.  
Their basic statistical characteristics before and after the crisis are given in the 
Appendix; see Tables A1.1, A2.1, and A2.2. Such data markedly points to differences 
in statistical characteristics of these SMEs between both time intervals, i.e., before or 
after the crisis, following a mere visual inspection of the Tables. Further comments 
are found in the Appendix. 
 
Determinants statistical correlations, based on the Pearson correlation coefficients, are 
also given in Table A3.1, in the Appendix.  
 
3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable used to determine the financial leverage of a company, in this 
essay, is the Total Debt to Total Assets ratio, called TDTAR, here below:  it indicates 
how many assets are financed by the debt. It can be used to determine the financial 
risk of the firms (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). In brief, if the ratio is higher than 1, the 
company is considered to have problems to pay back the debts and vice versa.  
 
3.3 Explanatory variables 
The six explanatory variables used to distinguish between ways of firm financing and 
its capital structure, before and after the financial crisis have been discussed through 
the literature review here above: Profitability, Non-debt tax shields and Liquidity, on 
one hand, Size, Tangibility, and Firm Growth, on the other hand.  The codes used to 
read the model and subsequent tests are given in Table 1.  
 
3.4 Model 
The data used in this essay is of the panel data type: it contains both cross-sectional 
data and time series data. In general, there are two investigation methods for panel 
data: the random effects model and the fixed effects model (Koop, 2008). The fixed 
effects model uses dummy variables to model the individual effect and the random 
effects model do not use dummy variables but assumes that the individual effect is a 
random variable (i.e.	  εit	   =	   vi	   +	   uit)	   (Koop, 2008). This essay employs the so called 
random effects regression model (Koop, 2008), also in line with Abor and Biekpe 
(2009) or Hall et al. (2004),  since there is no dummy variable; the individual effect is 
through the random variable	  	  εit.	  	  The model is written as	  	  	  TDTARit	  =	  α+	  	  	  β1	  ROAit	  	  	  +	  β2	  NDTSit	  +	  β3	  QRit+	  	  β4	  SIZEit	  +	  β5	  TANGit	  +	  β6	  GROWit	  +	  εit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   (1)	  	  
where  TDTARit  is the firm’s debts to assets ratio, i.e., the dependent variable for the 
i firm at time	   t;	   	   vi	   and	   uit	   stand as a stochastic variable and some error term, 
respectively. The   α   and βi   coefficients have to be determined.	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Table 1. Codes of variables for model and tests. 
 
 
Classification Variable name Code Formula 
“Internal Financing Variables” 
Profitability Return on Assets ROA Net Income /Total Assets 
Non-debt tax 
shields 
Depreciation to Fixed 
Assets Ratio 
NDTS Depreciation /Fixed Assets 
Liquidity Quick Ratio QR (Current Assets-Inventories) 
/Current Liabilities 
“External Financing Variables” 
Firm Size Natural logarithm of 
total assets 
SIZE ln (total asset) 
Tangibility Fixed Assets over Total 
Assets 
TANG Fixed Assets /Total Assets 
Firm Growth Operating Profit 
Margin 
GROW Operating Income /Net Sales 
 
 
4. Empirical Regression Results and Analysis 
 
Table 2. The regression analysis results for the explanatory variables (ROA, NDTS, 
QR, SIZE, TANG, GROW) and the dependent variable (debt to asset ratio, TDTAR),  
using 158 SMEs in China, before or after the crisis. Asterisks indicate significance:    
*** and **  at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
 
 
TDTAR Before Crisis After Crisis 
Variable Coefficient Signif. Coefficient Signif. 
ROA -1.4509 *** -2.6061 *** 
NDTS -379.6017 *** -205.8583 ** 
QR -0.8930 ** -10.6608 *** 
SIZE 119.2079 *** 76.3540 ** 
TANG 89.4439 *** 24.6262 ** 
GROW -0.0980 ** 0.0317 ** 
 
The  βi coefficients resulting from the regression analysis  are given in Table 2 for the 
6 explanatory variables (ROA, NDTS, QR, SIZE, TANG, GROW)  with respect to 
the dependent variable (debt ratio: TDTAR)  using 158 SMEs in China, distinguishing 
the  before or after the crisis cases. 
 
The regression coefficients are all statistically significant at 5 percent, for both before 
or after the financial crisis period cases. Moreover, since the coefficients of the 
variables are finite this means that each variable has an effect on the debt ratio.  The 6 
variables explain about half of the variation in the dependent variable (i.e. TDTAR, 
debts to assets ratio) before and after the crisis (0.5074 and 0.4592, respectively), as 
calculated through the regression coefficient R2. 
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Furthermore, the F-statistics for both cases are found to be much smaller than 0.05. 
Thus, one can conclude that there is a significantly positive relationship between 
TDTAR and the explanatory variables.  Notice that the statistical characteristics  after 
the financial crisis  (see Appendix) also indicate that the SMEs’ capital structure has 
been influenced by the crisis.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
It seems numerically indubitable, from the above data, that the variables in this 
regression model do have explanatory powers, allowing us some further theoretical 
analysis.  
 
First, consider the theoretical factors which practically influence an SME internal 
financing. (i) The ROA, representing the profitability of the firm, is found to be 
highly statistically significant.  This is consistent with the pecking order theory (Ross 
et al., 2013): firms with comparatively high profitability would decrease their reliance 
on external financing and rather use internal financing instead.  
 
(ii) Concerning NDTS, DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) mentioned that the tax 
deduction advantages of non-debt shields can effectively decrease the firm’s debt 
ratio. However, the non-debt shields (NDTS) coefficients are very negative, in the 
present cases; in fact, there is a weaker significant impact on the TDTAR after the 
financial crisis (the p-value is 0.2525). One possible reason for this somewhat 
surprising fact is conjectured to stem from the government lack of help to the SMEs. 
In other words, the imperfections of the taxation system in the Chinese market results 
in a low fixed assets depreciation rate, which thereby causes the concerned firms not 
to use the depreciation to gain funds. Thus, one deduces that the government policy 
current taxation system aims to foster the internal financing of the SMEs.  
 
(iii) There is a negative and statistically significant relationship between the liquidity 
(QR) and the debt ratio, both before and after the crisis, as could be hypothesized. The 
QR represents the ability for firms to resist risk, measuring a company's ability to 
meet its short-term obligations. It has decreased, on average, after the crisis (see 
Tables in Appendix). Nevertheless, the high (in absolute value) quick ratio coefficient 
value indicates that SMEs could get easily some access to bank loans. However, the 
(negative values of the) test results contrast with this expectation. Such negative 
regression coefficient results imply that the liquidity of SMEs is an important factor 
for risk determination by loan providers, - before and after the crisis.  One can 
propose two possible reasons to explain this finding. First, the quick ratio itself  does 
not provide financial institutions enough confidence on the SMEs. Secondly, the 
negative correlation implies that the profitability has quite affected their internal 
financing. In fact, SMEs would give up on expensive external financing if they have 
sufficient internal funds. To some extent, this result also proves one of our concerns, 
i.e. the impairing role of information asymmetry between financial institutions and 
SMEs.  
 
Next, consider the factors which can influence the external financing. There is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between the SIZE and the debts to 
assets ratio TDTAR. Thus, these firm sizes play an important role in determining the 
capital structure of the firm (Sogorb-Mira, 2005). The bigger the firm size, the more 
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easy one can get bank loans. With increasing, expanding, SMEs sales, the 
profitability, the quality of the products, and, the more so, the firm credit will 
increase. Nevertheless, extra funding requirement will increase accordingly. A 
possible intrinsic mechanism comes in mind: the large firms could use diversified 
investments to dilute risk. Hence, large firms will have lower bankruptcy cost, as 
discussed by Titman and Wessels (1988) indeed. On the other hand,   large size firms 
are likely to reveal more information to the public, within some psychological or 
marketing scheme; in so doing, such an information transparency makes them to 
appear more reliable than the small firms. Thus, one easily understands that the 
financial institutions, such as banks, prefer to lend money to large firms rather than to 
SMEs, - thereby explaining the positive correlations reported in Table A2.  
 
Notice that the impact of the SMEs’ tangibility on the leverage after the financial 
crisis is lower (yet, less significant) than before the crisis. This is interpreted as 
mainly due to the financial institutions greater awareness of the risks after the crisis. 
This is a somewhat interesting point to debate in further work. 
 
Finally, the regression results confirm the positive relationship between the firm 
growth and debt ratio in the SME Chinese market. However, it is less statistically 
significant. Nevertheless, a theoretical interpretation goes as follows: high growth 
SMEs have comparatively a more strong desire to expand after than before the crisis.   
After the crisis, SMEs with high growth rates are likely to obtain more external 
financing than at times before the financial crisis.  The fact that such SMEs resisted 
better to the crisis is a likely convincing argument for lenders indeed.  
 
In summary, profitability, non-debt tax shields, as well as the liquidity of the SMEs 
show a negative and significant relationship with the debt ratio. This implies that the 
profitable SMEs with more liquidity assets prefer to decrease their financial leverage. 
Secondly, the positive relationships between the financial leverage and both firm size 
and tangibility suggest that the big SMEs with more fixed assets will prefer more 
external debt financing. Third, after the financial crisis, the quick ratio and the ROA 
are more significant than before the financial crisis; this implies that the liquidity and 
profitability of the SMEs are important determinants for the loan providers, - 
especially after the crisis. Fourth, the impact of the SMEs’ tangibility on the leverage 
after the financial crisis is less significant than the influence before the crisis. Last but 
not least, the growth rates and non-debt tax shields of SMEs are not the main factors 
which influence the firm leverage, especially after the crisis. This is because the debt 
providers become more cautious due to the high risk of high growth SMEs. The banks 
tend to be credit grudging due to the information asymmetry (Wehinger,  2014). The 
SMEs cannot use the depreciation to obtain the internal financing due to the low fixed 
asset depreciation rate.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This research aimed at testing changes of the determinants of small and medium-sized 
manufacture enterprises capital structure, before and after the financial crisis; 158 
SME in China were investigated during the period 2004 to 2014.  
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We summarize a few undertaken objectives, point their theoretical and practical 
connections, more specifically focusing on China, but not only, and  provide thought 
for  further debates,  
 
(i) To identify how to help the SMEs to achieve rapid development. The argument 
stems in the common belief that any development of SMEs relates directly to the 
development of the national economy and creates a large amount of job opportunities. 
(Moreover, the conference on "Financing SMEs in Europe”, in 2008 pointed out that 
the economic recovery is largely relying on the development of small business; also 
recall that the small and medium-sized enterprises account for almost 99 percent of 
the registered enterprises in China; see also successive “Annual Report of SME 
Finance in China”: http://www.smefinanceforum.org/post/china-sme-finance-report-
2013). 
 
(ii) To identify a few difficulties which restrain the financing of SMEs and to present 
corresponding solutions as well as recommendations. There are several reasons which 
lead to the financing difficulty of the SMEs, - the situation worsening during the 
financial crisis. Without inserting quantitative means, we nevertheless consider that 
one of the most serious problems is information asymmetry between the SMEs and 
capital provider. In other words, the borrower could take advantages of the lender’s 
lack of important information, subsequently resulting in some potential risk. Beside 
such a frustrating relationship between banks and firms, the limitations within the 
SMEs’ financial system themselves  also lead to  financing difficulties. The loan 
decision by financial institutions will be much more dependent on the credit rating. 
Moreover, the financial institutions are unwilling to lend money to SMEs due to the 
imperfection of corporate governance structure standardized system and low credit 
grade. The high bankruptcy rate and high default rate of SMEs during the recession 
period has made the financing even harder.  
 
On the positive side, the long-term interaction and peer monitoring which are already 
pointed out by Banerjee et al. (1994), together with the development of small 
financial institutions could reduce the information asymmetry to some extent. On one 
hand, it is (of course!) important for SMEs to build a long term relationship with the 
banks. Thus, the banks could have access to valuable information from (usually 
opaque) small businesses. On the other hand, small financial institutions do not have 
as much options as large banks. Therefore, it seems necessary to develop the small 
financial institutions sector, which might prefer to invest into small business in 
contrast to large banks. It is indeed often claimed that SMEs’ financing channels are 
insufficient under the current economic environment. Many other alternatives, such as 
mezzanine financing and financial leasing assets, do recently provide more choice for 
SMEs indeed.  
 
(iii) To determine the impact of the financial crisis on the SMEs of the Chinese 
market and the changes of the SMEs’ capital structure after the crisis as well as the 
causes of these changes. More than 20 percent of the SMEs went bankrupt during the 
financial crisis, and the rest face severe shortages of capital. Moreover, the financing 
situation for SMEs are even serious due to tighter credit conditions: SMEs are 
required to provide more collateral assets and to shorten the repayment period. Thus, 
several determinants of the capital structure have been greatly influenced by the 
global financial crisis. “Interestingly”, in contrast, the recent severe economic crisis 
12	  
was not found to have had an impact on capital structure determinants for Greece 
SMEs (Balios et al., 2016). 
 
Even though, one might complain that 6 variables are not enough, one could add the 
number of employees, before and after the crisis, the age of the company, the debt 
ratio could be divided into long-term debt ratio and short-term debt, the structure of 
the managerial board, - taking into account gender (Watson, 2006), single or multiple 
owners (Newman  et al., 2013), etc., we consider that the regression results in the 
present case study prove much for our focus. With respect to the relationship between 
capital structure determinants and debt, the empirical evidence allows us to draw 
important conclusions regarding the applicability of the assumptions of Trade-Off 
Theory to the capital structure decisions of China SMEs at crisis time. In such a 
framework, our more interesting conclusions are: 
 
 1. The QR and ROA which represent the liquidity and profitability 
respectively have a significant negative relationship with the debt ratio both before 
and after the crisis. In other words, the high liquidity which implies a comparatively 
good risk tolerance ability is important for capital providers under growth and 
recession cycle period.  
 
 2. The regression analysis results indicate that non-debt tax shield (NDTS) and 
tangibility (TANG) are not the main determinants which influence the SMEs’ capital 
structure, - in this China case study. We stress that, apparently, the SMEs in China did 
not take full advantages of the non–debt tax shields, maybe due to the (imperfect or 
too complex) taxation system. In our it ,  might be also that they did not get much 
support from the government, at the recession time.  
 
 3. The firm size (SIZE) and growth (GROW) are factors that influence the 
external financing of SMEs; both have a s relationship with the debt ratio, - in the 
Chinese Market before the crisis. However, the P-value of GROW in the regression 
model has increased to 0.5505. One possible reason is that the high growth SMEs is 
always accompanied by high risks, due to the information asymmetry itself increasing 
the financing difficulty. Financial institutions such as banks would be more cautious 
when they lend money to high growth SMEs during the recession period. The strong 
positive correlation between the firm size and debt ratio, both before and after the 
financial crisis, imply that the loan providers believe that large firms have a stronger 
ability to repay the loans than the small firms. This also an important reason of SMEs 
financing difficulty: the latter could be reduced if applications of the trade-off theory 
is optimized internally by SMEs managers, leading to subsequent openness by 
external lenders. Again, we point toward the need for a reduction of the information 
imbalance. 
  
In summary, the results of this paper indicate influences of the financial crisis on the 
SMEs financing difficulty. If a political economy suggestion can be made here, let it 
be hoped that the Chinese government establishes laws to protect the SMEs as well as 
to provide more financing channels. It matters (Cotei et al., 2011).  
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APPENDIX 
 
A.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table A1.1. The skewness and kurtosis of the seven variables value distributions for 
the examined 158 Chinese SMEs over Jan. 2004 – Dec. 2014 
 
 
 TDTAR  ROA NDTS QR SIZE TANG GROW 
Kurtosis -0.5917 4.1821 -0.0802 46.1743 -0.0163 -0.4935 48.7021 
Skewness -0.0656 1.2536 0.6386 5.6583 0.1484 0.2195 5.8405 
 
 
Notice that the skewness  of the TDTAR  distribution is negative; the skewness is 
positive for the 6 determinants and even greater than 1 for ROA, QR and GROW.  
Moreover, the excess kurtosis of QR and GROW is quite leptokurtic. 
 
 
Table A1.2 Descriptive statistics of dependent variable (TDTAR) and 
6 explanatory variables of 158 SMEs in China before the financial crisis 
 
Before the crisis 
 TDTAR ROA NDTS QR SIZE TANG GROW 
        
Min 6.9917 0.3969 0.00 0.1043 -0.0068 0.0069 -3.9216 
Max 63.9846 12.317 0.0598 13.517 0.1561 0.5459 143.664 
Mean 28.0018 4.9934 0.0155 1.0766 0.0427 0.1719 16.9959 
SD 12.1433 2.0788 0.0089 1.4488 0.0281 0.0958 21.5761 
SD/Mean 0.4337 0.4163 0.5742 1.3457 0.6581 0.5573 1.2695 
 
 
Table A1.3. Descriptive statistics of dependent variable (TDTAR) and 
6 explanatory variables of 158 SMEs in China after the financial crisis. 
 
After the crisis 
 TDTAR ROA NDTS QR SIZE TANG GROW 
        
Min 3.9043 -3.238 0.0043 0.0337 -0.0471 0.0469 -41.1265 
Max 81.5558 19.813 0.0510 6.7322 0.1451 0.5508 307.914 
Mean 42.9165 4.3804 0.0220 0.4430 0.0391 0.2773 13.3546 
SD 17.0988 3.2405 0.0107 0.6938 0.0289 0.1115 31.8104 
SD/Mean 0.3984 0.7398 0.4864 1.5661 0.7391 0.4021 2.3820 
 
 
Comparing the values in Table A1.3 to those in Table A1.2 allows to show that the 
financial crisis did affect the capital structure of China SMEs.  
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First, especially for the firms’ liquidity: the mean QR indicates that firms had	  liquid 
assets available to cover current liabilities before the crisis, but could not do so after 
the crisis. The QR is one of the most affected terms during the crisis.  
 
The mean TANG (0.1719 to 0.2773) and that of NDTS (0.0155 to 0.0220) have 
increased after the crisis; this indicates that, after the financial crisis, SMEs  have 
more collateral assets when  borrowing money from banks. 
 
In order to have a better understanding of the differences before and after the crisis, 
one way is to use a ratio, the standard deviation divided by mean, called the 
coefficient of variation (CV=SD/Mean) (Atkinson and Nevill, 1998). The CV of QR 
and GROW are the highest both before and after the crisis, which implies that the 
liquidity and growth of the SMEs are always greatly fluctuating. It is important to 
notice that the CV of ROA, 0.4163 before the crisis, almost doubled after the crisis 
(0.7398). The means of the ROA are not very different:  4.9934 before the crisis and 
4.3804 after the crisis. However, the SD of the ROA goes up from 2.0788 before the 
crisis to 3.2405 after the crisis, which implies that the crisis  has influenced the 
profitability spread of the SMEs.  
 
A.2 Correlation analysis 
 
Table A2.1. Pearson correlation coefficient between each variable  
characterizing the 158 SMEs in the Chinese market. 
            
 ROA NDTS QR  SIZE TANG GROW 
ROA 1 -0.1857 0.5280 0.3284 -0.2540 0.7118 
NDTS  1 -0.1632 -0.3199 0.8290 -0.1851 
QR   1 0.1121 -0.2463 0.8659 
 
SIZE     1 -0.2421 0.2438 
TANG     1 -0.2086 
GROW      1 
 
In order to identify the possibility of multicollinearity among each variable, a 
correlation matrix of the variables is presented in Table A2.1. The multicollinearity 
occurs when there are high correlations among explanatory variables (i.e. very close 
to +1 or -1) which can lead to unreliable and biased results of regression.  Except for 
three correlation statistics visually close to +1, there is no point of debating about a 
multicollinearity problem (Koop, 2008).  
 
 
